Just before 11 a.m. on June 2, 2016, at the tail end of a torrential rainstorm, Pvt. Tysheena James drove the military transport vehicle carrying 11 of her comrades to the edge of a water crossing. The truck was built to withstand 30 inches of moving water. Officials estimate the rain-swollen Owl Creek was nearly three times higher.
Hours earlier, Fort Hood’s Installation Operations Command had issued an alert closing the crossing at Owl Creek and dozens of others throughout Fort Hood due to the historic rainfall, an alert that never reached the unit.
James, 21, hadn’t been properly trained to drive the large troop carrier, especially in adverse conditions. In fact, investigators would later learn, the unit lacked a formal driver training program, a requirement under Army regulations.
At James’ side was Staff Sgt. Miguel Colon Vasquez, 38, an experienced “Master Driver” leading the training patrol. Army officials say it was Colon who made the decision to try to cross Owl Creek, even though a functioning bridge was just about 200 feet away.
James pushed ahead into the water and within seconds, witnesses said, the truck overturned and was carried away downstream. Nine of the 12 soldiers, including James and Colon, drowned in one of the deadliest training accidents ever for the U.S. military.
According to copies of the Army’s investigatory report on the accident, obtained by the American-Statesman through a Freedom of Information Act request, investigators pinned blame on Colon and a series of his decisions, including his seemingly inexplicable choice to try to cross the creek, in apparent defiance of his platoon leader’s order.
But the document also reveals systemic safety lapses at Fort Hood and an “apathetic safety mentality” in Force Supply Company F.
The Army investigator recommended letters of reprimand against the unit’s company commander, platoon leader and platoon sergeant, who he said were aware that soldiers, including James, had inadequate training to drive Army convoy vehicles. One leader, who wasn’t named in the report, was singled out for creating a climate of “safety complacency.”
Because the discipline amounted to administrative action, Fort Hood officials said they couldn’t confirm if the letters were issued. Such letters “can call soldiers’ attention to their deficiencies and give them an opportunity to correct them before more severe measures are required,” Fort Hood officials have said in the past. The names of the unit leaders weren’t released.
Inadequate training
Investigators found that few soldiers had taken or even knew about Fort Hood’s local hazards instructional course. Taking that course is a requirement for young soldiers when they arrive at the installation, and it includes information on flash floods in Central Texas creeks. For at least a month, a time period that included James’ arrival at Fort Hood in late April 2016, the link to the online course was broken, investigators found. The report also noted that the certificate of completion could be printed from the internet without actually taking the class.
“I’ve never seen or heard of the local hazard course due to it never being disseminated down the chain,” one soldier told investigators. Others described the unit’s haphazard approach to driver training for large military vehicles.
Fort Hood officials said that since the accident they have “reinforced” to all unit commanders that soldiers under the age of 26 are required to take the Army’s intermediate drivers course. They said the local hazards course had been updated to include additional guidance on low water crossings.
“Fort Hood leadership remains engaged with all of our soldiers to ensure safety measures are part of everything we do in accident prevention actions,” said Fort Hood public affairs director Tom Rheinlander in a statement.
The report also found lapses in how Fort Hood communicates flash flood and road closing alerts to soldiers. Fort Hood’s Installation Operations Center issued an initial report at 5:05 a.m. closing crossings like the one at Owl Creek to vehicle traffic. The flooding warning was sent to brigade safety officers at 9 a.m. via email, but never made it to the company before the convoy left the motor pool at 10:20 a.m.
Noting that Fort Hood had two previous serious incidents at low water crossings since 2000, including one fatality, the investigator wrote that “risks associated with low water crossing at Fort Hood have yet to be adequately reduced.”